CSC 574 Computer and Network Security

Social Networks Security

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(Derived from slides by Gianluca Stringhini)

Social Networks Rely on Trust

Social network users share content from sources they trust. Trust can come from two sources:



Cybercriminals use social networks too

Anatomy of Social Network Abuse

Where do misused accounts come from?

- Spam
- Malware
- Phishing
- Information stealing

Fake Accounts

Created by cybercriminals or purchased on the black market



Leverage the *modus operandi* and the characteristics of fake accounts for detection

"Detecting Spammers on Social Networks" [ACSAC 2010]

Very high accuracy, low false positives

Disadvantages of using fake accounts

- Need to build connections
- Can be deleted at no cost
- Are expensive to create

Without the victim's trust, social network abuse is ineffective

Manipulating User Trust

- Hijacking trust
- Building trust

Twitter CEO: 'We suck at dealing with abuse'

Dick Costolo says trolls are costing Twitter users

By Nitasha Tiku and Casey Newton on February 4, 2015 09:25 pm 🛎 Email

Hijacking someone else's reputation

Compromised Accounts



The AP Twitter Hack

Not only humans read tweets



Insight

People develop habits when using social networks

These habits hardly change over time



Hashtags



A message sent by an attacker will show differences from the typical behaviour

- #camresearch
- #extremesleepover
- #fresheradvice1660
- #robottakeover
- #underthemicroscope
- #nicturethis

COMPA



COMPA maintains a behavioural model for Online Social Network accounts (using SVMs)

Any time a new message is posted, it is checked against the model

- Messages that match the profile are used to update the model
- Messages that do not match the profiles are discarded and flagged as an attack

COMPA in Action



COMPA would have blocked the Associated Press compromise

- Time: 0.00
- Source: 0.99 (Web, usually SocialFlow)
- Hashtag: 0.06
- Domain: 0.88 (No URL present)
- Mentions: 0.07
- Language: 0.00

Does it work in all cases?



Detecting Large-scale Compromises



- Grouping "similar" messages
- Checking messages against their behavioural profile
- Detecting as a compromise groups with high rates of anomalous messages

COMPA: Evaluation

Twitter

- •1.4 billion tweets (10% of the total)
- •343,229 compromised accounts

Facebook

- •106 million status updates
- •11,499 compromised accounts

False positives between 3.6% and 0.5%, depending on the history of the user's activity

COMPA: Discussion

Large-scale compromises

An attacker would have to learn the behaviour of each of his victims \rightarrow **UNFEASIBLE**

To achieve their goal, attackers' messages have to be different from what legitimate users usually post

Behavioural Modelling to Fight Spearphishing

Email users develop habits too

We can use these habits to detect attackers who compromise email accounts and send forged emails (**spearphishing**)

- Writing habits (stylometry)
- Composition habits
- Interaction habits

Able to detect between 90 and 98% attack emails

False positives between 8% and 1% depending on the length of the email history

Quickly building an online reputation

Twitter Followers = Perceived Reputation



Building a network of followers is difficult!

Shortcuts to Success



Can One Really Buy Followers?



Twitter Follower Markets

Different types of followers for sale

- Fake accounts (Sybils)
- Compromised accounts
- Pyramid schemes

Pyramid Markets



Paid Subscriber

- Free subscribers \rightarrow Victims
- Paid subscribers \rightarrow Customers

Twitter's ToS forbids users to participate in Twitter Follower Markets

Active Twitter Follower Markets

Market (sorted by order of returned results)	\$ for 10K Followers	Pyramid?
Newfollow.info	\$216	YES
Bigfolo.com	\$91.99	YES
Bigfollow.net	\$70	YES
Intertwitter.com	\$65	NO (fake accounts)
Justfollowers.in	\$95	YES
Twiends.com	\$169	NO (fake accounts)
Socialwombat.com	\$49	NO (fake accounts)
Devumi.com	\$64	NO (fake accounts)
Hitfollow.info	\$214	YES
Plusfollower.info	\$214	YES
Buyactivefans.com	\$40	NO (fake accounts)

Market Sizes

Let's look at tweets advertising the top five markets

10% of the all public tweets (3.3 billion tweets), collected over a period of four months

Market	Tweets	Victims
BigFollow	662,858	90,083
BigFolo	4,732,016	611,825
JustFollowers	302	257
NewFollow	77,865	38,341
InterTwitter	0	0
Total	5,473,041	740,506

Detecting Market Victims

Purchased followers from the most popular five markets



In total, the authors identified 69,222 victims

Detecting Market Customers



Detecting Market Customers

Signed up 180 newly-created accounts as market victims

Identified 2,909 market customers

Customer Characteristics

Compared our set of customers to a set of two million regular users picked at random



Customers have more followers than regular users

Customer Follower Dynamics



Customer Follower Dynamics

During an observation period of one week:

• Spike in Followers \geq 50 over an hour:

50% Customers, 0.4% Regular

• Steady decrease of followers for \geq 10 consecutive hours:

60% Customers, 0.05% Regular

Follower Dynamics Detection

Developed a classifier to detect customers in the wild

Ground truth: Set of 2,909 customers and 10,000 regular accounts (monitored for a week)

Classifier: Random Forests

10-fold cross validation: 98.4% true positive rate 0.02% false positive rate

Detecting Customers in the Wild

Monitored a set of two million regular accounts for two weeks

Detected 684 customers

- Observed only two million accounts
- Purchase needs to happen during our observation

Analysis of the Identified Customers

The detected accounts have the expected characteristics of customers

- They belong to wanna-be celebrities and small businesses
- They do not post interesting content

Buying followers does not help in becoming influential (median Klout 45)

• A customer with 103,000 followers \rightarrow Klout score of 57

Twitter fails in detecting customers: 2 out of 684 were suspended